We have now moved into a third epoch in the history of the postwar global economic order. The first went from the late 1940s to the 1970s and was characterised by liberalisation, principally among the high-income countries closely allied to the US in the context of the cold war. From the 1980s and especially after the fall of the Soviet Union, more radical forms of economic liberalism, known as “neoliberalism”, spread across the world. The creation of the World Trade Organization in 1995 and the accession of China in 2001 were high water marks of this second era.

We are now moving into a new era of world disorder, marked by domestic mistakes and global friction. Domestically, there has been a failure, particularly in the US, to adopt policies that cushion the adjustments to economic change and provide security and opportunity for those adversely affected. The rhetorical ploys of nationalism and xenophobia have instead focused anger on “unfair” competitors, especially China. In the US, the idea of strategic competition with China has also become increasingly bipartisan, while China itself has become more repressive and inward-looking. With the war in Ukraine, these divisions have deepened.

How in such a world might a liberal trading order be sustained? “With great difficulty” is the answer. Yet so much is at stake for so many that everybody who has influence must try.