There is much to admire in China’s recovery. Between the second and third quarters, its economy expanded by 4.9 per cent. It is unique among the world’s largest economies in that the IMF expects it to avoid a contraction this year. That owes much to Beijing’s success in stamping out Covid-19, along with the country’s manufacturing prowess. Yet, digging into the numbers, the picture is not quite as rosy as it may seem.

Long before the pandemic, the world’s second-largest economy looked dangerously unbalanced. Beijing has placed a tremendous amount of focus on the headline gross domestic product figure as a measure of its economic prowess. A consequence has been that, when growth has been at risk of falling to levels deemed by the Chinese Communist party to be too low, the state has engaged in aggressive intervention.

That intervention has often involved funding projects, notably in the construction sphere, that can have little economic purpose other than to spur demand. It has also led to levels of investment of state-owned enterprises far exceeding the contribution made by the private sector.