It has been nearly a year since Xi Jinping led the seven-strong standing committee on to the stage of the Great Hall of the People as the new head of China’s Communist party. At the time, there was much speculation, partly encouraged by Mr Xi’s more down-to-earth manner, about whether his appointment might herald a fresh attempt to implement economic and political reform. Those hopes have not yet been answered. Mr Xi has shown himself rather more adept at consolidating his grip over the Communist party than at opening up either China’s economic or political system. He has brought cadres to heel with an anti-corruption campaign, established what looks like a firm grip on the People’s Liberation Army and launched a campaign against bloggers in order to stifle criticism of the party. He has even revived sloganeering reminiscent of the Mao era. Some speculate that Mr Xi has tacked to China’s political left in order to provide cover for market-oriented reforms. But if he is a closet reformer he has a funny way of showing it. There have been intimations of changes to policy – a liberalisation of banking licences here, the announcement of a free-trade zone there. But nothing that amounts to much.
習近平帶領“七常委”作為中共新一屆領導班子亮相人民大會堂，距今已近一年。當時，或許是受到習近平更為平實風格的鼓舞，人們對于他上任后能否發起新一輪政治經濟改革，有很多期待。這些期待尚未得到回答。從過去一年看，比起進一步開放中國的經濟或政治體系，習近平更擅長的是加強對中共的控制。他發起一輪反腐行動，讓干部們夾起了尾巴；他建立起對人民解放軍的鐵腕控制；還對互聯網上的博主們展開一輪打壓，以壓制對中共的批評之聲。他甚至重新使用一些帶有毛澤東時代特色的口號。有人猜測，習近平向中國政治左派靠攏，是為了為市場改革提供“掩護”。但如果他是一位“密室改革者”，那么他的行事方式未免有些滑稽。政策似乎的確有些變化——一會兒是銀行牌照管制的放松，一會兒是自貿區，但實質性的變化卻乏善可陳。