The crisis in the eurozone was inevitable but has been accelerated, and worsened, by the banking collapse. It will not be solved easily or quickly. When it is, it may lead to a very different EU.

The root of the present chaos can be traced back to bad politics taking precedence over sensible economics. At Maastricht, which I attended as prime minister, the assumption was that – before the euro was born – the economies of member states would converge: that is, operate at broadly the same levels of efficiency. Safeguards were set: it was agreed national fiscal deficits should not exceed 3 per cent of gross domestic product. Later, a Stability & Growth Pact was enacted to ensure sound fiscal policies. Yet, when the 11 founder members launched the euro in January 1999, these prudent preconditions were ignored.

After the birth of the euro, some southern states over-indulged on low interest rates and racked up debts. So did their citizens, without hindrance from their governments who basked in the popularity of the boom. When Germany and France over-stepped the criteria on debt without any penalty by the commission, the criteria became toothless. Debt soared. This would have led to a crisis on its own, but it was hastened by the 2008 meltdown.