Following the Peter Principle, we should expect people to be promoted to the level of their incompetence. It may be unfair, but that thought crossed my mind in a week in which the Bank of England has been given unprecedented responsibilities. It retains the operational independence for monetary policy conferred on it by Gordon Brown in 1997 as chancellor. In addition, it regains all the responsibilities for financial oversight of which it was deprived by the Labour government – and then some more. These aspects are not confined to the UK, although the thoroughness and relentlessness of the operation are perhaps typical of the not-very-pragmatic British.
根據(jù)彼得原理(Peter Principle)，我們應該預期每個人都會被提升至他們所不能勝任的位置。這么說或許有些不公平，但一周前，當英國央行(BoE)被授予了前所未有的職責時，這個想法就從我的腦海中劃過。英國央行保留了1997年戈登?布朗(Gordon Brown)任財相時授予其的、獨立操作貨幣政策的權(quán)力，此外，又重新獲得了被工黨政府剝奪的一切金融監(jiān)管職責——以及更多職責。這些職權(quán)可能不是英國央行所獨有的，但擴權(quán)行動的徹底性和堅決性或許是不那么務實的英國人的典型作風。